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Monsters to Destroy? The Rhetorical Legacy of John 
Quincy Adams’ July 4th, 1821 Oration 
 
Jason A. Edwards 
 
This essay examines how the John Quincy Adams’s foreign policy maxim of “we do not go in search of monsters to 
destroy” has been appropriated in contemporary foreign policy, including the recent 2016 presidential campaign, 
arguing his aphorism are authorizing words that validate and ratify the positions of pundits, politicians, and policy-
makers of not only critics of U.S. foreign policy, but those who defend it.  Mapping Quincy Adams’s aphorism al-
lows us to explore the boundaries and direction of America’s role in the world and how it impacts America’s excep-
tionalist ethos.   
 
Keywords: American exceptionalism, John Quincy Adams, foreign policy rhetoric, America’s role in the world 
 
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed in his sweeping history of international rela-
tions, Diplomacy, American foreign policy and its accompanying rhetoric has always had at its 
heart a tension between those who would argue that “America serves its values best by perfecting 
democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind”1 with those that maintain 
“America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world.”2 These two 
divergent approaches to U.S. foreign policy, known as the mission of exemplar and the mission of 
intervention, flow from a similar belief composition in America’s exceptionalism.3 American ex-
ceptionalism structures the arguments over what its role in the world should be.4 The tension Kis-
singer noted stems from U.S. foreign policy makers largely diverging and debating as to how the 
United States should enact its exceptionalist credo. Exemplarists and interventionists offer differ-
ent visions for how the United States demonstrates, maintains, and strengthens America’s excep-
tionalism. This clash between exemplarist and interventionist voices is at its apex when the United 
States undergoes a transition from one era to another in foreign relations (e.g. World War II to the 
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1Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 17. 
2Kissinger, Diplomacy, 17. 
3See Jason A. Edwards, Navigating the Post-Cold War World: President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Rhetoric (Lan-
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Cold War) or a major foreign policy decision emerges (e.g. the League of Nations debate) that 
needs to be decided.5  
In contemporary American foreign policy, interventionist voices have been the loudest con-
cerning the direction of U.S. international relations. These voices are not shy about invoking and 
appropriating the words and deeds of great interventionists such as Presidents Wilson, Franklin 
Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan as sources of rhetorical invention to support their argu-
ments for U.S. global leadership. Exemplarist voices have largely been drowned out by the drum-
beat of the interventionists and do not have a reservoir of voices they can invoke, save for one: 
John Quincy Adams (JQA).   
The words of John Quincy Adams, specifically a portion of his July 4, 1821 oration, continue 
to provide rhetorical support for arguments exemplarists make concerning U.S. foreign policy. For 
the July 4th, 1821 holiday, Secretary of State Adams was invited by the citizens of Washington 
D.C. to address them in an oration. Adams took this rhetorical opportunity to answer critics of the 
Monroe Administration’s foreign policy.  Quincy Adams spoke forcefully about what U.S. foreign 
policy doctrine should be.  In his most famous passage, Adams stated:   
Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will 
her heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be.  But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to 
destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all.  She is the champion and 
vindicator only of her own. She will commend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, 
and the benignant sympathy of her example. She well knows that by once enlisting under other 
banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve 
herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual ava-
rice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The funda-
mental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force.... She might become 
the dictatress of the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit....  
 
[America's] glory is not dominion, but liberty. Her march is the march of the mind. She has a spear and 
a shield: but the motto upon her shield is, Freedom, Independence, Peace. This has been her Declara-
tion: this has been, as far as her necessary intercourse with the rest of mankind would permit, her prac-
tice.6  
 
The key idea in this passage was that the United States does not interfere and become involved 
in the affairs of other states. It would not, to paraphrase Jefferson’s first inaugural, engage in “en-
tangling alliances” with Europe or other states.  If America did its destiny would move from “lib-
erty to force”, becoming “dictatress of the world,” and possibly losing its democratic soul.  It 
would be involved in affairs that would “beyond the powers of extrication.” As such, America’s 
true power to influence in the affairs of the world lay with it sounding the horn of democracy, but 
only engaging in activities to perfect its own example and be a model for others to emulate. 
                                                          
5See McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam; McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State; 
Karl K. Schonberg, Pursuing the National Interest: Foreign Policy Debates in Twentieth Century American Foreign 
Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003). 
6John Quincy Adams, An Address Delivered at the Request of a Commission at the Citizens of Washington; On the 
Occasion of Reading the Declaration of Independence, on the Fourth of July1821 (Colombia, MO: University of 
Missouri Fourth of July Archive Collection), 32. 
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Pulitzer Prize winning historian Samuel Flagg Bemis maintained Adams’ July 4th oration was 
a landmark document in the history of American foreign policy.7 Arthur Whitaker explained his 
address stands as one of the “few really striking speeches ever made on Independence Day, one of 
the most sensational ever made by an American Secretary of State on any occasion.”8 H.W. Brands 
described Adams’ July 4th oration, particularly his phrase the United States “goes not abroad in 
search of monsters to destroy,” to be the “most succinct and compelling exemplarist statement 
ever.”9 In essence, the specific passage above captured the fundamental principle of U.S. foreign 
policy conduct in the 19th century. Certainly, an examination of JQA’s July 4th oration is warranted, 
but in this paper I am concerned with the legacy of his words, particularly for America’s contem-
porary political era, including the recent 2016 presidential campaign.  Quincy Adams’ words have 
been invoked and appropriated by various academics, politicians, pundits, and policy makers, as 
they search for rhetorical support in attempting to fight against and/or keeping the U.S. away from 
tackling proverbial “monsters.” 
In this paper, I unpack this contemporary legacy asserting John Quincy Adams is an authoriz-
ing figure within the realm of American foreign policy rhetoric.  More specifically, the passage 
that was quoted earlier in which the U.S. “goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy” are 
authorizing words that pundits, policymakers, and politicians appropriate to use as support and 
legitimate their discussions of U.S. international relations. I argue these words serve a sanctioning 
function for those that invoke them. By sanctioning I mean rhetors use the words of JQA to validate 
and ratify specific arguments, while inviting audiences to see the wisdom of their ideas for con-
temporary foreign policy. This sanctioning function is primarily what Bruce Gronbeck calls a ge-
netic argument. A genetic argument is where “a rhetor can return to the originary moment of some 
part of civic life to essentialize it, asking for a recommitment to a presumably primal but presently 
ignored value or mindset.”10 When rhetors use Adams words as a source of rhetorical invention 
they argue, on the one hand, against the dominant interventionist foreign policy paradigm and 
return to the 19th century foreign policy exemplarism of non-interference with other states. On the 
other hand, JQA’s aphorism is used to reinforce an interventionist position. According to their 
logic, Quincy Adams’ advice is not relevant for a contemporary era and should be ignored because 
of modern global dangers. His dictum becomes rhetorical fodder for camps on both sides of the 
debate over America’s role in the world. Mapping how John Quincy Adams’ authorizing words 
and his memory has been used can provide a deeper understanding of where U.S. foreign policy 
is heading, what the specific advocates of said policy want to do, and the possible implications for 
America’s role in the world. 
Before I delve deeper into analyzing JQA’s aphorism let me discuss why I believe this article 
is a good fit for the Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric. In the first issue of JCR, Brett Lunceford 
asked the question “Must We All Be Rhetorical Historians?”11 Lunceford argued most rhetoric 
journals focused on articles they thought would have long shelf-lives. Thus, the focus in these 
                                                          
7Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 
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8Arthur Preston Whitaker, The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830 (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1962), 350. 
9H.W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 9. 
10Bruce Gronbeck, “The Rhetorics of the Past: History, Argument, and Collective Memory,” In Doing Rhetorical 
History, ed. Kathleen Turner (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 55. 
11 Brett Lunceford, “Must We All Be Rhetorical Historians: On Relevance and Timeliness in Rhetorical Scholar-
ship,” Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric 1 (2011): 1-9. 
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journals has become on analyzing important historical figures such as Martin Luther King, Jr. or 
Abraham Lincoln or changes to rhetorical theory. Both of which are certainly important to the 
discipline of rhetoric, but Lunceford expressed frustration with the publishing process because of 
the lengthy turnaround time. Moreover, any essay that focused on contemporary affairs would be 
published long after the event had taken place, thereby diminishing the potential impact this essay 
could have. Therefore, Lunceford helped launch JCR whose mission was to combine the rigors of 
academic inquiry but have the timeliness of journalism.  
In the following issue, Michael Tumolo responded to Lunceford’s article with a discussion of 
useful rhetorical history.12 Tumolo asserted that history is an important component for timely and 
relevant scholarship. In a contemporary setting, a rhetorical historical perspective of ideas and 
events allows for more in-depth understanding, evaluation, and action within the present. One of 
the primary ways this perspective can be found is through the study of collective memory. Rhe-
torical studies of collective memory demonstrate directly how history influences the present and 
future decisions. Moreover, it offers a contextual framework for how we can debate different ideas 
and events. I would suggest collective memory studies perform the ultimate goal of rhetorical 
scholarship, which as Barry Brummett has argued, is to “teach people how to experience their 
rhetorical environments more richly.”13 
In its short history, JCR has published several essays that used history to provide, if nothing 
else, important contexts for a discussion of contemporary issues. For example, Thomas Benson’s 
article on “The Rhetoric of Civility” was an in-depth study in the calls for greater civility after the 
shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords.14 Benson used Cicero and examples from Amer-
ica’s political past to a long historical vocabulary of political invective. Calls for greater civility 
and incivility in public discourse are nothing new and Benson’s article helps ground that perspec-
tive. Benson’s study on civility, with its historical grounding, seem particularly relevant in the era 
of President Trump. Additionally, in his essay on President Obama and the rhetoric of empathy, 
Erik Leake noted Presidents Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush were quite successful in their uses 
of empathy on the campaign trail.15 While short, Leake’s historical discussion of Carter and Bush’s 
use of empathy grounds his study providing an important historical context for this topic in presi-
dential rhetoric. Finally, Christopher House examined the Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memora-
bilia.16 House maintains the JCM is a counter museum whereby examining the memory of Jim 
Crow visitors can become active-participants in larger dialogue on the issue of race. Considering 
the controversy over police shootings of unarmed black men, the Black Lives Matter movement, 
and other issues surrounding race, House’s essay can be viewed as an important contribution to 
this contemporary issue. 
I submit this essay is a useful form of rhetorical history that is appropriate for a contemporary 
era. Considering Donald Trump’s words actions on immigration, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
the Paris Climate Accords, NATO, different trade deals like NAFTA, and a whole range of foreign 
policy issues there are considerable questions about America’s global leadership. My discussion 
                                                          
12 Michael Tumolo, “On Useful Rhetorical History,” Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric 1 (2011): 55-62. 
13 Barry Brummett, “Rhetorical Theory as Heuristic and Moral: A Pedagogical Justification,” Communication Edu-
cation 33 (1984): 103. 
14 Thomas Benson, “The Rhetoric of Civility: Power, Authenticity, and Democracy,” Journal of Contemporary 
Rhetoric 1 (2011): 22-30. 
15 Erik Leake, “Empathizer-in-Chief: The Promotion and Performance of Empathy in the Speeches of Barack 
Obama,” Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric 6 (2016): 1-14. 
16 Christopher A. House, “Remembering Jim Crow in the Age of Trump: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Functions of 
the Jim Crow Museum of Racist Memorabilia,” Journal of Contemporary Rhetoric 7 (2017): 1-18. 
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of how the aphorism “monsters to destroy” has been used over the last 20 years offers parameters 
on a historical debate concerning America’s role in the world that has raged for generations. Un-
derstanding what this debate is and what the stakes potentially are is vital for Americans having 
an informed and vigorous discussion about what America’s role has been, where it is, and where 
it should go in the future. 
To that end I cite journal articles, books, speeches, and newspaper articles from those who 
quote JQA’s July 4th oration to illustrate how it has functioned in foreign policy circles since the 
end of the Cold War, particularly since 9/11. I examine this period because it is the most contem-
porary transitional period in U.S. foreign policy that brought with it many important events for our 
international relations (e.g. 9/11, the interventions into Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, and 
Afghanistan, Bush’s preemption strategy, etc.). In conducting this analysis, I examined each item 
that referenced JQA’s Fourth of July oration looking for different patterns on how they appropri-
ated Adams’s wisdom. In what follows, the cited items are representative examples of the overall 
themes found in my analysis. In the next section, I offer a more extensive discussion of collective 
memory and the authorizing figure.  
 
Collective Memory and the Authorizing Figure 
 
Collective memory is an oft cited topic within rhetorical studies.  John Bodnar suggested collective 
memory is “a body of beliefs about the past that help a public or society understand both its past 
and present, and by implication its future.”17 Collective memory is a particular way to understand 
the past. It involves an interpretation of history that can be widely ratified by the general public. 
This interpretation is important because it helps us understand the past, how that past influences 
the present, and how it may contribute to our future.18 By nature, people evoke an understanding 
of history that is selective and partial.  These selective and partial memories are managed in certain 
ways for strategic purposes.  
Collective memory can come in various forms such as myths, metaphors, and the specific use 
of history. Sarah Spring noted the use of history is a means to garner authority.19 Pundits, politi-
cians, and policymakers often use specific historical events and figures because they resonate more 
than others, such as World War II, the Holocaust, Vietnam and other events to lend greater author-
ity to their specific policy positions.20 As Mary Stuckey put it, “certain events, like certain people 
and certain places, become symbols for actions and policy positions, these metaphors help to order 
political reality.”21 The use of these historical events and/or persons provides argumentative data 
for the rhetor’s larger position, while also giving legitimacy to that specific person’s discourse. 
For example, American presidents often invoke the memory of Abraham Lincoln to discuss issues 
                                                          
17John Bodnar, “Public Memory in an American City: Commemoration in Cleveland,” In Commemorations: The 
Politics of National Identity, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 76. 
18Jill A. Edy, “Journalistic Uses of Collective Memory,” Journal of Communication 49 (1999): 71-85. 
19Sarah Spring, “The Uses of History: Deliberative Analogy and Victor Davis Hanson,” Contemporary and Debate 
28 (2007): 91-115. 
20See Benjamin R. Bates, “Circulation of the World War II/Holocaust analogy in the 1999 Kosovo Intervention: Ar-
ticulating a Vocabulary of International Conflict,” The Journal of Language and Politics 8 (2009): 28-51; George N. 
Dionisopoulos & Steven R. Goldzwig, “The Meaning of Vietnam: Political Rhetoric as Revisionists Cultural His-
tory, Quarterly Journal of Speech 78 (1992): 61-79; David Hoagland Noon, “Operation Enduring Analogy: World 
War II, The War on Terror, and the Uses of Historical Memory,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 7 (2004): 339-366. 
21Mary E. Stuckey, “Remembering the Future: Rhetorical Echoes of World War II and Vietnam in George Bush’s 
Speech on the Gulf War,” Communication Studies 43 (1992): 249. 
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of equality within the United States.  Specifically, President Obama has used Lincoln’s memory 
and his words to suggest that equality of opportunity is not secured unless the results of our rights 
are equalized among individuals.22 Similarly, Ronald Reagan used the memory of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. to argue against the need for more civil rights legislation because he maintained that 
King’s dream had already been achieved.23 Lara Brown argued when political figures, particular 
American presidents, reference historical heroes, such as their predecessors, they invite compari-
sons, offer justifications, and provide gravitas to those making arguments about contemporary pol-
icy and principles.24 These historical heroes serve as a source of authority and data for rhetors to 
use for their own purposes. Donald Rice called this kind of discourse the “rhetoric of the author-
izing figure.25 To define the parameters and purposes of this form of collective memory, Rice 
demonstrated how Cuban president Fidel Castro invoked the memory of Cuban hero Jose Marti to 
foment the Cuban Revolution.  Although Rice’s study focused on Cuban politics, the basic func-
tions of the authorizing figure are equally applicable to American political discourse. 
Authorizing figures perform three different functions.  One function is that s/he can define and 
unify movements. The rhetor using the authorizing figure distinguishes what the movement is and 
what it is not. Castro used the memory of Marti early on to define and unify his revolutionary 
moment.  For Castro, Marti “functioned as a kind of catalyst that helped to bring the principles and 
ideals of the struggle into focus.”26  Referencing Marti served to define and unify Cubans behind 
his cause, while bolstering his revolutionary credentials. 
 Second, authorizing figures are used to sanction interpretations and events. These figures val-
idate and ratify policy choices and principles, which can be controversial. Sanctioning demon-
strates the orator and the authorizing figure are doing similar work, despite major differences in 
the circumstances they face. The sanctioning function gives the appearance of a seamless transition 
from one era to the next. The core principles and/or policies of the past are no different than in the 
present.  It offers the idea that if the authorizing figure were alive that s/he would not only approve 
of the rhetor’s ideas, but enact similar ones. Castro used Marti to endorse his implementation of 
his Marxist economic policies, Marxist viewpoints, support his policy of military ventures into 
third-world nations, and the development of social internationalism. Marti’s words and actions 
served as precedents that Castro drew upon to lend authority to his political worldview and poli-
cies.   
Finally, authorizing figures are used to legitimate future goals. Once Castro was entrenched in 
power, he mixed Marti’s vision of Cuba’s future with his own interpretation of what Cuba should 
look like. Marti’s “anti-Americanism” was transformed into Castro’s future goal to battle all “im-
perialism.” Castro appropriated Marti to legitimate what he thought Cuba could strive for in the 
future.27 
                                                          
22Jason R. Jividen, Claiming Lincoln: Progressivism, Equality, and the Battle for Lincoln’s Legacy in Presidential 
Rhetoric (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011), 171. 
23Denise M. Bostdorff and Steven R. Goldzwig, “History, Collective Memory, and Appropriation of Martin Luther 
King, Jr: Reagan’s Rhetorical Legacy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (2005): 661-690. 
24Lara M. Brown, “The Greats and the Great Debate: President William J. Clinton’s Use of Presidential Exemplars,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 37 (2007): 124-38. 
25Donald E. Rice, The Rhetoric of the Authorizing Figure: Fidel Castro and Jose Marti (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1992); Jason A. Edwards, “Sanctioning Foreign Policy: The Rhetorical Uses of Harry Truman,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 39 (2009): 454-472. 
26Rice, The Rhetoric of the Authorizing Figure, 61.  
27Rice, The Rhetoric of the Authorizing Figure, 126 
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In contemporary American foreign policy discourse, authorizing figures consist primarily of 
interventionists such as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, John Kennedy, and 
Ronald Reagan.28 Their memories are invoked to support and/or negate a policy or principle that 
is being debated or implemented. John Quincy Adams is the most prominent exemplarist voice 
consistently mentioned and sanctioning different foreign policy principles, doctrines, and policies.  
Invoking JQA assists in establishing their interpretation of foreign policy events, policies, and 
principles.  In this next section, I outline the contours of JQA’s authorizing words for contemporary 
U.S. foreign policy, finding that after analyzing a variety of texts JQA’s rhetoric was used to sanc-
tion interventionist and exemplarist positions.  
 
The Contemporary Legacy of John Quincy Adams July 4th Oration 
 
When John Quincy Adams argued the United States should not go in seek of “monsters to destroy” 
he reasserted and extended a doctrine of non-intervention that was a hallmark of early U.S. foreign 
policy. However, Adams’ time as Secretary of State was set against the backdrop of great upheaval 
in the international system.  Revolutions occurred all throughout South America, Central and East-
ern Europe. The Monroe Administration was pressured by voices within Europe and the United 
States, most notably Speaker of the House Henry Clay and Senator Daniel Webster, to change the 
course of American foreign affairs. Specifically, Clay and Webster suggested the United States 
create an alliance with Great Britain and other powers so they could directly support those revolu-
tions, particularly in Greece, which had captured the imaginations of thousands, including the poet 
Lord Byron.  
Speaking to this pressure to change course in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, Adams as-
serted in a letter to Robert Walsh, Jr. that directly supporting those revolutions, particularly in 
Europe, amounted to a “political doctrine in my estimation of the most pernicious tendency to this 
country . . . that doctrine that it is the duty of America to take an active part in the future political 
reformation of Europe.”29 For Adams, the foreign policy advocated by Clay and Webster would 
fundamentally alter America’s character, but also endanger its democratic experiment. Taking “ac-
tive part in the future political reformation of Europe” may infect the body politic with all of the 
defects of the European system, a system the United States had attempted to separate itself from 
with the American Revolution. America best influenced the affairs of the world with the power of 
its example, not the imposition of its political principles.  His July 4th oration gave him the oppor-
tunity to directly rebut and refute any changes to America’s policy of non-interventionism. His 
rhetoric was an eloquent defense of curtailing U.S. activity abroad.  
Fast forward over 100 years later and since the end of the World War II exemplarism within 
U.S. foreign policy circles, while still important, has been eclipsed by the intellectual heirs of 
Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.  Interventionism is the primary way the United States enacts its 
exceptionalist in the international arena. Yet the end of the Cold War brought with it considerable 
debate within American foreign policy circles about what America’s proper role should be.30 This 
                                                          
28See Phillip Abbot, The Exemplary Presidency: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Political Tradition (Am-
herst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990); Edwards, “Sanctioning Foreign Policy.”  
29John Quincy Adams, “Letter to Robert Walsh, Jr,” The Writings of John Quincy Adams, Volume VII ed. by 
Worthington C. Ford (New York: Macmillian Company), 117. 
3030 See Edwards, Navigating the Post-Cold War World; Karl K. Schonberg, Pursuing the National Interest: Foreign 
Policy Debates in Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003). 
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debate allowed the exemplarist wisdom of John Quincy Adams to resurge and be appropriated 
when discussing America’s role in post-Cold War politics.   
 
The “Charming” but Outdated Wisdom of JQA 
 
When analyzing how JQA’s authorizing words have been employed America’s post-Cold War 
foreign policy I noticed different variants of its usage. For example, some politicians and pundits 
used Adams’ words as evidence to demonstrate the folly of his foreign policy wisdom for the late 
20th and early 21st centuries. Instead, they asserted the United States must maintain and extend its 
interventionism or there would be considerable consequences for the U.S. and the world. For ex-
ample, neoconservative intellectuals William Kristol and Robert Kagan criticized the Clinton ad-
ministration and other conservatives for abiding by a doctrine of not going in “search of monsters 
to destroy,” which they called a “charming old metaphor” that if adhered to fully would “leave 
monsters on the loose, ravaging and pillaging to their hearts’ content, as Americans stand by and 
watch.”31 The Clinton administration’s inaction in Rwanda and Bosnia were examples of monsters 
being allowed to run loose.32 For Kristol and Kagan, the monsters Clinton decided not to fight 
were not only in humanitarian crises, but were the leaders of rogue states like Iraq and North Korea. 
Their position was that because the United States stood as the lone superpower after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, giving it the power destroy most of the globe’s monsters adhering to “a policy 
of sitting atop a hill and leading by example becomes in practice a policy of cowardice and dis-
honor.”33 Instead, Kristol and Kagan advocated a much more proactive form of foreign policy they 
titled “benevolent hegemony.” Benevolent hegemony called for the United States to actively pro-
ject its military, diplomatic, and economic power to not only destroy monsters (e.g. Saddam Hus-
sein) but to deter them from arising in the first place.  According to Kristol and Kagan, this kind 
of foreign policy doctrine would make the world safer, cement America’s global leadership, and 
ensure the post-Cold War world would be shaped in its image.  If taken seriously, JQA’s advice 
would imperil the United States’ role as world leader and its ability to project power to protect its 
interest and those of its allies.  JQA’s lesson for 20th century America was that not “going in search 
of monsters to destroy” harmed America’s exceptionalism. 
After the attacks of September 11th many argued monsters, this time in the form of terrorists, 
had found the United States. If the United States did not prosecute the war on terror with full 
vigilance and maintain an international leadership position this would allow monsters to return.  
Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig stated that “John Quincy Adams warned us against 
going abroad ‘in search of monsters to destroy,’ and some argue that the war on terror is such a 
case. I disagree. On 9/11, the monster found us asleep at home and will continue to find us inade-
quately prepared unless we muster more strength and more wisdom.”34 For Haig, “more strength 
and more wisdom” came in the form of projecting more military might toward Iraq, which would 
                                                          
31William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 75 (1996): 31; 
Owen Harries, “The Foreign Policy Race; Bob Dole’s Calculated Pragmatism,” The New York Times, September 22, 
1996, 68-75.  
32The Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist Christopher Hitchens made a similar point over ten years later when he ad-
vocated that allowing monsters like Serbian General Ratko Mladic to run loose, committing war crimes against in-
nocent civilians, and causing general chaos during the Yugoslav civil wars of the early to mid-1990s was evidence 
of the folly of Adams’ advice in a 20th and 21st century world.  See Christopher Hitchens, “The Monster Inside the 
Frail Old Man,” National Post, June 1, 2011, 14. 
33Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 31. 
34Alexander Haig, “The US Will Stay the Course in Iraq in Coming Months,” The Australian, July 11, 2007, 15. 
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curtail a monster from reappearing in that country. Haig’s opinion was circulated at a time when 
the United States had destroyed the monster of Saddam Hussein, but the overall war was going 
badly for American forces. Many politicians opposed President Bush’s troop “surge” in Iraq in 
early 2007; the United States, they said, should no longer be there searching for monsters. For 
Haig, the advice the opposite because if the United States did not strengthen its position in Iraq 
then more Saddam Husseins were likely to arise, putting America in more peril.  In other words, 
the exemplarist wisdom of John Quincy Adams in a 21st century world weakened the United States 
and only invited enemies to attack America.   
Boston Globe columnist Jeff Jacoby, similar to Kristol and Kagan, admonished those for ad-
vocating the United States shrink from its position as global super cop, even with the military 
missteps in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Jacoby, “in Adams’ day America was not the 
mightiest, wealthiest, and most influential nation on the face of the earth. Today it is.  If the United 
States is the world’s only superpower, and if we shrink from the role of global policeman, no one 
else will fill it.”35 For Jacoby, the United States had no choice but to go in “search of monsters to 
destroy.” As he noted, “with great power comes great responsibilities, and sometimes one of those 
responsibilities is to destroy monsters: to take down tyrants who victimize the innocent and flout 
the rules of civilization.”36 Senator Marco Rubio struck a similar tone when he asserted, “some 
suggest that America should heed the famous words of John Quincy Adams and go ‘not abroad, 
in search of monsters to destroy.’ The problem is if America turns inward and ignores the monsters 
abroad, they are likely to come here.”37 Senator Rubio then asserted those monsters arrived prior 
to World War I, World War II, and on September 11th, 2001. Accordingly, the United States must 
be vigilant. It must be on the offensive. It must project its strength through military might and 
maintain its global leadership or the monsters will return.  
Ultimately, these interventionists demonstrate that John Quincy Adams’ advice worked solely 
for a 19th century world where the United States was weaker and could afford the luxury of staying 
out of global affairs. Up until the 2016 election, Adams’ foreign policy doctrine is evidence as to 
what the United States should not do.  His advice is “charming” but it is “old” and cannot account 
for the dynamics of post-Cold War global affairs and America’s responsibility to act when others 
cannot. Consequently, maintaining an interventionist position upholds the leadership role America 
has built for the past one hundred years and strengthened its exceptionalism at the same time. By 
maintaining the leadership role the United States can continue to the world’s leader and greatest 
nation. By contrast if political leaders obey the maxim of Quincy Adams it would entice an enemy 
to attack, degrading the United States, and by implication its status as an exceptional nation be-
cause it did not maintain its vigilant global leadership role. 
 
The Sage Wisdom of JQA Lives On: Pre 9/11 
 
Despite criticism that not going in “search of monsters to destroy” was folly for the age of global-
ization there were a number of pundits and intellectuals who used Adams’ sage wisdom as part of 
an argument to curtail American interventionism. This curtailment can be divided into two brief 
eras: prior to September 11, 2001 and post-September 11. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold 
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War, even though the Bush and Clinton administrations were committed to engagement and inter-
vention with the international community, many voices advocated the United States return to a 
“traditional” doctrine of American foreign policy. For example, former Reagan Administration 
United Nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick asserted the U.S. had won the Cold War and it 
was to time to return to a foreign policy of “normalcy,” which was not going in search of “monsters 
to destroy.” For Kirkpatrick, the Cold War was an aberration, a necessary one, but an aberration 
nonetheless in U.S. foreign policy history.  In “normal” times, without a great enemy to face, the 
United States must eschew thoughts of benevolent hegemony and influence the affairs of the world 
through its example.38    
Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Walter McDougall made a similar argument. Quoting John 
Quincy Adams, McDougall maintained that a tradition within U.S. international affairs is to “obey 
that dictum” of going in search of “monsters” to destroy.  All of America’s wars were entered into 
with reluctance and unwillingness by many Americans. For McDougall, identifying “monsters,” 
destroying them, and moving on was “not the American style.”  Rather, he asserted “our traditional 
wisdom is based on refusing to cry before we are hurt, going the extra mile to insure (should 
conflict come) that there is doubt about whom it to blame, and letting the enemy take the first 
shot.”39 
Benjamin Schwarz, an Atlantic Monthly correspondent, derided America’s global ambitions 
and its “crusade” to intervene in the Balkans, Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia, and other hotspots around 
the world where there were no vital U.S. interests.  He noted that he and others who opposed these 
interventions were being branded with the foreign policy epithet of “neo-isolationist.”  As Schwarz 
explained, “neo-isolationism is based on the grand tradition that embraces not only the views of 
left-wing foreign policy critics, but also a strain of thoughtful conservatism that goes back to John 
Quincy Adams” who “admonished Americans to go ‘not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.’” 
Schwarz further observed George Kennan, the architect of the Cold War, Senator William Ful-
bright, and journalist Walter Lippmann, all supported JQA’s mindset, even in a contemporary set-
ting. These intellectuals, like Adams, realized that “foolish globalism” leads us to “unending wars 
of intervention” and intoxicates Americans into “thinking with the illusion that it is a crusader for 
righteousness.”40 Not going in search of monsters to destroy was not just advice for 19th century 
America as suggested by some.  Rather, it was a principle to be obeyed in all eras of American 
history. 
Prior to September 11th, these exemplarists used John Quincy Adams foreign policy advice as 
a means to curtail American engagement abroad, primarily military engagement. For Kirkpatrick, 
McDougall and Schwarz, the tradition of the United States not “taking the first shot” was the more 
prudent course for U.S. politics. Maintaining an interventionist position merely led to “unending 
wars of interventionism” that proved disastrous for America domestically and internationally, 
haunting us like Vietnam has since the 1970s. Additionally, this advice was not merely rants from 
peaceniks on the liberal left, but was balanced between “left-wing” circles and “conservativism.” 
The lesson of exemplarism was that it has a long history of being supported by all sides of the aisle 
in U.S. politics and if implemented could protect the American people from “foolish globalism” 
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and the unenviable position of being “crusaders” of the modern world, a policy that would surely 
end in disaster as it had for its predecessors. 
 
Post 9/11  
 
After September 11th, for just over a year or so, John Quincy Adams’ advice of not going in “search 
of monsters to destroy” seemed inappropriate for the circumstances in which the United States 
found itself.  The Bush administration easily made the claim that the Al-Qaeda “monster” had 
found the United States, partly because America had been asleep at the wheel of its post-Cold War 
foreign policy.41 Accordingly, most Americans supported the war in Afghanistan and the ongoing 
hunt for Osama Bin Laden.  
However, as America’s eyes turned toward the “monster” of Saddam Hussein, coinciding with 
the Bush administration’s promotion of its pre-emption doctrine,42 an internal American debate 
arose about America’s role in the world.  Robert Kagan maintained the Iraq War inspired a “very 
old debate, which Americans have thrashed out in every generation.”43 This debate is not about 
being anti or pro-American, but it is “between two different American traditions concerning how 
the United States can best promote its values and ideals.”44 On one side of this debate, as noted 
earlier, were people who supported America’s “benevolent hegemony” or what Kagan called our 
“messianic impulse.”  This impulse—which is “Americans belief in the possibility of global trans-
formation”—has “always been the more dominant strain in the nation’s character.”45 This domi-
nant strain received even greater support after America’s invasion of Iraq.  Public intellectuals 
such as Salman Rushdie and Dinesh D’Souza, Canadian Labor Party Leader Michael Ignatieff, 
historians Margaret MacMillan and Niall Ferguson, as well as others all supported U.S. interven-
tion. Speaking specifically about U.S. influence, D’Souza called the United States “the most mag-
nanimous imperial power ever,” which allowed the United States to approach Iraq in a manner to 
transform not only that country, but the whole of the Middle East.46 Similarly, Niall Ferguson drew 
upon the experience of Britain’s empire, calling it a great civilizing influence upon the world.  He 
implored the Bush administration to stay the course, bringing stability and democracy to Iraq and 
the Middle East.47 
However, significant public opposition grew toward the Iraq war. Here John Quincy Adams’ 
returned as an authorizing figure for critics of U.S. foreign policy. In the months leading up to the 
Iraq war several commentators argued that JQA’s maxim must guide U.S. foreign policy even 
amidst the ongoing fight against Al-Qaeda. For example, Mark Danner asserted Adams principle 
of not going “in search of monsters to destroy has been a cherished truism of our foreign policy, 
central to how Americans look at themselves and at their role in the world . . . if America invokes 
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and occupies Iraq, they no longer will be.”48 Following a similar logic and responding to an article 
by Salman Rushdie who observed the U.S. should remove Saddam Hussein from power to ease 
the suffering of the Iraqi people, Sheldon Richman of Conway, Arkansas invoked Adams, further 
stating “the Constitution of the United States does not empower the U.S. government to overthrow 
foreign rulers who oppress their people. The Framers, suspicious of government power—espe-
cially war power—omitted that power.”  The United States “is the well-wisher to the freedom and 
independence of all.  She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”49 Hiraoki Sato stated 
the “one rationale that underlies the debate for American intervention is democracy.” However, 
Sato noted Adams in his July 4th, 1821 address stated the United States never interfered “in the 
concerns of others, even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings.”  If she did then 
“the fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force.”50 For Sato, 
American intervention into Iraq put the United States on the path to become “the dictatress of the 
world,” which meant America would “be no longer the ruler of her own spirit.”51 The New Straits 
Times argued that President Bush has already “fathered the Dictatress, an illegitimate enterprise 
where the global community is concerned.”52 The Philadelphia Inquirer asserted the Iraq war 
caused the United States has gone from a “nation born out of longing for freedom from domination 
has now become the dominator.”53 Famed historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., after invoking the wis-
dom of JQA, opined by “seeking out monsters” George W. Bush “has overturned two centuries of 
U.S. thinking on global diplomacy.”54 For all the individuals cited, America’s Iraq war altered the 
character of U.S. foreign policy from being a cheerleader for democracy to the creation of an 
American imperium, something which most Americans voiced their opposition. Empire only 
brought with it grave consequences internally and externally as it had to every other empire.  
Several rhetors spoke specifically about those consequences.  One such concern was the in-
creased distrust of the United States by people in the Middle East and the loss of American prestige 
abroad because of the Iraqi invasion. America’s Iraq war resulting in “abuses at Abu Ghraib, the 
destruction of Fallujah, the alleged Marine rampage in Haditha—all are reflections of how, in our 
search for “monsters to destroy,” we have found them in ourselves.”55 In other words, Adams was 
right. Our intervention got America into a situation when it tried to get rid of a monster, but became 
one. America’s inability to manage to the war did irreparable harm to its image in the Middle East 
and abroad. By implication its exceptional ethos was damaged by becoming a “dictatress” to the 
world instead of being a nation to emulate.  
An additional consequence was the Iraq War has practically bankrupted the United States eco-
nomically and morally. Andrew Bacevich, while tracing our penchant to empire to the 1970s, as-
serted the Iraq War has brought the United States to the brink of destruction. It undercut American 
exceptionalism, not enhanced it. If the United States did not stop its oversea adventures it will 
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mean further disaster for the American economy, morality, and its standing in the world.56 Amer-
ica has been destroying itself by ignoring Quincy Adams’ advice. If JQA was not heeded, the U.S. 
could very well lose her democratic soul. 
Consequently, the only way for the United States to correct problems is to specifically “extri-
cate ourselves from Iraq so that Iraqis can rule their own nation and Americans can, once again, 
become the rulers of her own spirit.”57 More generally, critics of American imperium, such as 
Jonathan Freedland, implored the United States to return to its traditional exemplar tradition of 
U.S. foreign policy that follows John Quincy Adams’ advice to “export its brand of liberty . . . not 
through force but by the power of its own example.”58 As Adams put it in 1821, America must be 
the “well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all,” while also “commending the general 
cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example.”59 If the United 
States did not return to the foreign policy principles of Adams then it not only will alter traditions 
of U.S. foreign policy, but it will go down a road, as demonstrated by the incompetent intervention 
into Iraq, with consequences that will endanger U.S. prestige abroad, but it might very well bring 
down the United States itself, similar to the experiences of the Roman and British empires. Going 
in search of “monsters to destroy” only led to disaster for the U.S. and its body politic. 
 
President Obama and Libya 
 
When Barack Obama entered the presidency in 2009 it appeared, in part, that he would actually 
heed JQA’s advice of not going in “search of monsters to destroy.” President Obama disavowed 
President Bush’s strategy of preemptive war—attacking an enemy before it attacked you; declared 
he would make it a central point of his foreign policy to reduce the world’s nuclear stockpiles and 
the threat of nuclear war; end the war in Iraq and wind down the war in Afghanistan.60 Instead, 
Obama stated it was time to do some “nation-building here at home.”  Obama’s America would 
influence the affairs of the world, not through building an American imperium and intervention, 
but through its domestic example.  
  However, in 2011, the Arab Spring would remake Obama’s foreign policy.61 The Arab Spring 
began in Tunisia with a single person who protested against lack of economic opportunity within 
the country, governmental suppression of civil rights, and government corruption at all levels. This 
person’s martyrdom brought about a movement that saw hundreds of thousands of protesters in 
Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Syria, Oman, Yemen, and Jordan mobilizing to speak out against corrup-
tion, political freedom, and lack of economic opportunity. Within a few weeks, dictators in Tunisia 
and Egypt were ousted from power and the next target appeared to be Libya. The momentum of 
the spring moved to Libya in late February 2011.  Peaceful protesters began gathering the streets 
of Libya. Seeing what had happened in Tunisia and Egypt, Libya’s leader, Moammar Gaddafi, 
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began a violent crackdown of the protesters. Soon this crackdown erupted into all-out civil war 
and endangered hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. Gaddafi launched an offensive 
against Libya’s rebels that was indiscriminate in its targets. According to some estimates, Gaddafi 
killed over 10,000 civilians in a short period of time.62 The attacks on civilians became so bad that 
the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of force to protect civilians from Libyan 
forces. 
 Responding to the Security Council resolution, President Obama announced in a national ad-
dress a U.S. mission, along with allies in NATO and other Middle Eastern countries, to protect 
civilians. Prior to the announced intervention and afterwards critics of President Obama signified 
their opposition to U.S. involvement in Libya by, partly, invoking John Quincy Adams foreign 
policy maxim. Pundits warned of the dire consequences that would ensue and its future effects on 
U.S. foreign policy. For example, Ryan Girdusky argued America cannot “afford to ‘go in search 
of monsters to destroy’ because it was not “in America’s interests to intervene.”  Additionally, the 
intervention would result in huge “civilian casualties,” “loss of treasure America can ill afford” 
because of our ill-fated wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and “anti-U.S. blowback.”63 For Girdusky, 
this blowback could be the greatest consequence because it will fuel anti-Americanism in the Mid-
dle East where it was already quite high, even when President Obama’s attempted to reset relations 
with the region.64 Because of America’s past problems with the Middle East (e.g. pronounced sup-
port of dictators over democracy and the Iraq War) “America doesn’t have the credibility to make 
war in the Arab world.  Our touch in this is actually counterproductive.”65 
 Opponents of Obama argued a more important consequence for U.S. foreign policy was that 
an intervention into Libya would set a dangerous precedent by expanding how and when American 
military forces would be used. Spurred on by the lack of international action in Rwanda, Bosnia, 
and Darfur a growing cacophony of voices within the United States and from across the world 
maintain the international community has a fundamental duty to protect civilian populations from 
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.66 Libya was the first test of this new global 
“responsibility to protect” to protect civilians from their leaders.67 However, Tim Rutten asserted 
JQA’s admonition against foreign interventions “remains resonant, particularly when applied to 
our murkily enmeshment in the revolutionary uprising against Libya’s Moammar Quadafi. Rutten 
further argued Libya is a “political revolution, which now appears to be settling into a civil war. 
Those can be bitter and bloody affairs fraught with atrocity and tragedy on every side,” but the 
situation did not meet the threshold for genocide or crimes against humanity, at least not in the 
sense of those committed against Armenians, Jews, and Tutsis. Rather, Libya’s problems look 
similar to other countries dealing with civil unrest. If an intervention occurred it suggested “that 
the humanitarian crisis category is being expanded beyond reason.”68 In other words, America’s 
intervention into Libya stretched the notion of “humanitarian intervention” to include a multitude 
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of civil unrest across the globe. For Rutten, as well as other critics, Obama’s policy toward Libya 
established a precedent that America would have to commit itself to quell every pocket of violent 
outbreak across the globe.  Accordingly, when the United States could not fulfill that burden, be-
cause no nation ever could, then the United States and the Obama administration’s foreign policy 
would be accused of abandoning those in need and its foreign policy would be deemed hypocriti-
cal. Thereby, reinforcing a stereotype that many within the international community share about 
U.S. foreign policy and ultimately undercutting any kind of credibility the Obama administration 
had attempted to rebuild on the world stage. America’s inability to meet its commitments only 
lessened its status as a global leader. The suggestion being President Obama by acting in Libya 
endangered its foreign policy, its leadership, and its future. 
Neil Hrab, writing for the Washington Examiner, shared a similar sentiment when he stated 
“wherever you are now, John Quincy Adams, you’ve got to be shaking your head at the news that 
the U.S. and its allies have rushed into just the sort of foreign adventure you warned against.” 
According to Hrab, “the leaders of the US, France, Canada, the UK, Denmark, etc. are determined 
to go to Libya, ‘in search of monsters to destroy.’” Finding these monsters give political leaders 
the precedent they needed to assert “for the right to intervene militarily elsewhere in the world—
perhaps in Sudan, one day; perhaps Zimbabwe, perhaps even Iran.  Libya is a test case for their 
new foreign policy doctrine . . . legitimizing more frequent use of military force in international 
relations.”69 Hrab’s column implied this “right to intervene” was not only a “new foreign policy 
doctrine” but that it may have some disastrous unforeseen implications.  This new doctrine would 
drag the United States and the west into conflicts across the world, which America may not be able 
to extricate itself (e.g. Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq).   
An even greater implication and subsequent problem was that this “frequent use of military 
force” had echoes of the previous Bush administration’s policy of pre-emptive war and military 
power as a primary weapon in its foreign policy arsenal. While President Obama did not advocate 
pre-emption to deal with America’s enemies his use of military power made the use of force a 
primary option instead of a secondary one. Consequently, critics of American imperium would be 
emboldened; arguing Obama was merely an extension of President Bush’s foreign policy and that 
this imperium would be embedded in U.S. foreign policy culture. Ultimately, as Maureen Dowd 
of the New York Times succinctly wrote, Obama’s “search for monsters” in Libya committed “the 
United States to endless wars of altruism. And that’s folly.”70  
The pronounced logic for this “war of altruism” was to stop civilian casualties within Libya, 
but for Obama’s critics it had three larger effects. First, it implied the United States will inevitably 
look hypocritical in international relations, which was/is a constant criticism of its foreign policy. 
For example, the U.S. pronounces its support of human rights, but allows huge abuses to go on in 
places across the world. It rhetorically supports democracy, but does not invest the time and effort 
to see those ideas through in every nation.  It allowed America’s enemies/opponents to assert why 
Libya and not Syria? Egypt? Bahrain or other parts of the world? What are the rules for America’s 
intervention? For Obama’s critics, the Libya intervention established a precedent and perception 
that the U.S. should intervene in every conflict where leaders commit atrocities against their peo-
ple.  Because the United States could not possibly intervene militarily everywhere at all times, it 
makes America look duplicitous, which ultimately undercuts its credibility on U.S. foreign policy. 
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The less credibility it has the less leverage the U.S. has to establish coalitions and partnerships to 
tackle global problems the international community will face.  
A second effect was a Libyan intervention to protect civilians appears as the right thing to do, 
but it also reinforces American imperium.  The United States, along with other Western nations, 
imposed its will upon smaller country about how the world should be run.  In that sense, President 
Obama appeared no different than President Bush.   
Finally, America’s Libyan military adventure increased American militarism into U.S. foreign 
relations and militarism in international relations in general. No longer will the use of force be a 
last resort; a tool for defense rather than offense.  Rather, force became a primary option. Increased 
global militarism in the world increased the potential for global conflict, sucking the United States 
into conflict not of its choosing and that it might be incapable of fighting.  America will find itself 
embroiled in conflict with “entangling alliances,” something which George Washington, Thomas 
Jefferson, and John Quincy Adams warned the United States should avoid.  Consequently, Obama 
put America in danger and deviated from its founding principles of exemplarism. Thus, the only 
choice was to return to John Quincy Adams’s foreign policy maxim of not seeking out monsters 
to destroy.  
  
John Quincy Adams’ Return to the White House   
 
Despite the critics of President Obama’s military adventure into Libya interventionism held dom-
inant sway over most of his term in office and was/is the primary intellectual construct of most of 
America’s foreign policy intelligentsia. However, the 2016 presidential debate began to change 
the debate. Perhaps, it was the trillions of dollars spent in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Per-
haps, it was Americans who were tired of looking for “monsters” overseas. Instead, they wanted 
to focus on perfecting the U.S. example to better demonstrate global leadership. Whatever the 
reason the 2016 presidential campaign marked a prominent return of the foreign policy principles 
of John Quincy Adams. For example, for the first time ever in a presidential debate, JQA’s apho-
rism was invoked by a presidential candidate. In the October 13, 2015 CNN Democratic Presiden-
tial Debate, former Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley was discussing Hillary Clinton’s support 
for the use of military force in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. O’Malley argued the president should never 
take the use of military force off the table, but “whenever we go in contrary to John Quincy Ad-
ams’s advice—‘Searching the world for monsters to destroy’—and when we use political might 
at the expense of democratic principle we hurt ourselves.”71 Here O’Malley clearly argued the 
interventionism of President Obama and potentially of a President Clinton could actually do more 
harm than good. For O’Malley, U.S. foreign policy makers spent too much time “searching the 
world for monsters to destroy” particularly through military intervention. America must take a 
more measured response with diplomacy, sanctions, or not getting involved at all. Because of we 
ignore Quincy Adams’s advice “we hurt ourselves” at home and abroad. In other words, the foreign 
policy of Hillary Clinton would bring potentially more harm than good. 
Despite O’Malley’s warning Hillary Clinton won the Democratic nomination for president. 
For the Republicans, the debate became more pronounced and JQA’s wisdom found a modern-
day champion in Donald Trump. Most of the Republican presidential candidate field were tradi-
tional interventionists. Although they disagreed with candidate Clinton on a number of issues there 
                                                          




were committed to maintaining and even extending the mission of interventionism that had domi-
nated U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Candidate Donald Trump rejected those foreign 
policy norms.  
A representative anecdote of his foreign policy views can be found in his first major foreign 
policy address on April 27, 2016 before the Center for the National Interest. Here Trump discussed 
his foreign policy of “America First,” which rhetorically resembled the pre-World War II group 
that advocated staying out of the war in Europe. Toward the end of his address Trump stated, “I 
will seek a foreign policy that all Americans, whatever their party, can support, and which our 
friends and allies will respect and welcome. The world must know that we do not go abroad in 
search of enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old 
friends become allies.”72 While Trump did not invoke JQA’s name, his principle that “we do not 
go abroad in search of enemies” clearly was a reference to Adams’ foreign policy advice; advice 
that presidential administrations had ignored for decades, which had resulted, at least for Donald 
Trump, in a material and moral disaster for the United States. As he further noted in his April 27th 
address, “many Americans must wonder why our politicians seem more interested in defending 
the borders of foreign countries than their own . . . No country has ever prospered that failed to put 
its own interests first . . .We will no longer surrender this country, or its people to the false song 
of globalism.”73 Here, Trump clearly implied the dominant mission of interventionism was going 
to come to an end. The United States would no longer be lulled by the “false song of globalism.” 
Rather, America can only prosper by putting “its own interests first.” Materially that manifested 
in Trump’s specific criticisms of foreign policy deals like NAFTA; costly military interventions 
into Iraq and Libya; not standing up to and having NATO nations pay their fair share for the cost 
of defense; creating terrible arms reduction deals like the Iranian nuclear deal; and locking Amer-
ica into job-killing climate deals like the Paris Accords. For Trump, these decisions made by Dem-
ocratic and Republican administrations put the United States into material and moral peril. The 
United States followed Senator Rubio’s advice, did not turn inward, but went searching for ene-
mies but the enemies still followed us home and now those decisions were wreaking havoc on 
American domestic life. For Trump, the true “monsters” the United States needed to avoid cer-
tainly terrorist groups like ISIS, but also the people who had invaded Iraq, allowing ISIS to be 
created in the first place, and those who negotiated trade deal like NAFTA and the Iranian nuclear 
deal. The “monsters” America needed to avoid were interventionists. Trump’s address at the Cen-
ter for the National Interest made it clear that once he was president he would reverse the dominant 
logic of U.S. foreign policy. He would become a champion of JQA’s sage wisdom once more.  
Trump’s campaign message of “America First” and curtailing its foreign policy adventures 
abroad resonated with many Americans. For example, a Tampa Tribune editorial called Trump’s 
April 27 speech the start of a “revolution” that repudiated the “Obama-Clinton foreign policy and 
the legacy of Bush Republicanism and neo-conservatism.” Furthermore, when George W. Bush 
declared that America’s goal would become to end tyranny in our world. An utterly utopian delu-
sion, to which Trump retorts by recalling John Quincy Adams’ views on America: She goes not 
abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”74 One Denver Post columnist proclaimed ten reasons 
why he switched to Trump, which included “America first: Donald Trump dares speak the long 
avoided truth that our country never wins anymore. His inclination toward less going abroad in 
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search of monsters to destroy, in the John Quincy Adams mode, points to a better change of peace 
through strength in the Reagan mode.”75 While these are just two examples, Trump’s foreign pol-
icy message struck a chord with many Americans because he not only won the Republican nomi-
nation against a field of traditional foreign policy Republicans, he changed the Republican party 
platform to better reflect curtailing America’s foreign policy adventures, and he defeated the 
“Obama-Clinton” foreign policy in the 2016 election. His presidency clearly suggests he will move 
U.S. international affairs to one that more closely aligned with some of the precepts set forth by 




In this paper, I have argued that John Quincy Adams serves as an authorizing figure in U.S. foreign 
policy discourse, whose famous phrase “we do not go in search of monsters to destroy” functions 
to sanction arguments made in America’s ongoing debate on the extent of its involvement with the 
international community. John Quincy Adams’ aphorism has been used by proponents and oppo-
nents alike. With the election of Donald Trump, it appears clear that the pendulum has swung back 
to a different foreign policy construct at least for the next four years. The question remains what 
is the continuing legacy for John Quincy Adams as a foreign policy authorizing figure?  
First, this paper demonstrates that authorizing figures cannot only be used to support argu-
ments, but also to negate them.  In the overall study of collective memory, scholars typically focus 
on the “positive” aspects of memory.  In other words, memories function to support or sustain 
larger discourses within use.  Certainly, the memory of JQA serves that overall purpose, but it also 
acts as a foil to those who would argue against U.S. foreign policy. James Janack would term this 
negative collective memory as dystalgic.76 Janack examined how memories of the Soviet era were 
utilized in the 1996 Russian presidential election between incumbent Boris Yeltsin and his Com-
munist-party opponent Gennady Zyuganov. He noted Yeltsin’s campaign rhetoric continuously 
argued the Soviet era was oppressive, full of corruption stifles political rights, and brought misery 
to millions of Russian citizens. Electing Zyuganov would only continue that legacy of oppression, 
corruption, fear, and misery for millions. Yeltsin used memories of the Soviet era to offer lessons 
as to what Russians should not return too. Instead, Yeltsin’s budding democratic government of-
fered more freedom, more prosperity, and more hope for a brighter Russian future than they had 
ever enjoyed. Similarly, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Alexander Haig, and others used JQA’s 
words to offer lessons as to what U.S. foreign policymakers should not do. According to these 
interventionists, JQA’s wisdom was fine for the 19th century, but proved folly in a world where 
the United States was the unquestioned global power. To leave the world to its own devices, as 
JQA’s heirs would have the United States do, would bring nothing but danger and destruction to 
America, as it did on September 11th. Rather, an active foreign policy that engaged and was shaped 
by the U.S. to serve its larger interests was the key to maintaining and extending Western and by 
extension American values. Authorizing figures can be used to negate and fight against certain 
policies and principles. Therefore, the function of negation or dystalgia should be added Rice’s 
three functions of the authorizing figure. 
Additionally, the rise of Donald Trump has fundamentally altered America’s exceptionalist 
ethos. As Henry Kissinger noted in Diplomacy there is an inherent tension in U.S. foreign policy 
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between those who want to demonstrate U.S global leadership through becoming a beacon for the 
world to emulate. Then there are those who advocate the U.S. should crusade for those values 
globally. Typically, these different advocates are at odds with each other (e.g. League of Nations 
debate). After World War II, presidents began to rhetorically fuse the exemplar and the interven-
tionist missions together. For example, in his Truman Doctrine address, President Truman argued, 
“free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our 
leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of 
our own nation.”77 Here Truman argued for renewed global leadership to defend “free peoples of 
the world.” At the same time, the “welfare of our own nation” was predicated on this global lead-
ership. In other words, America’s ability to be an exemplar was directly tied to fulfilling our inter-
ventionist mission. After the Cold War, President Clinton actually reversed the logic of this rhe-
torical fusion. He asserted we must rebuild America’s example at home, which then offers more 
rhetorical gravitas to perform our global leadership duties. In other words, presidents fused our 
exceptionalist missions together to advocate for U.S. global leadership. Trump’s rhetoric has bro-
ken that fusion. His rhetoric, once again, creates a tension between America’s exceptionalist mis-
sions that had been largely removed since the end of World War II. Because of this rhetorical 
fission, there is great confusion among America’s foreign policy intelligentsia and leaders across 
the world about what will comprise U.S. foreign policy? Will it continue its status as the de facto 
leader of the world? How will this impact multilateral institutions, treaties, and the U.S. diplomatic 
and military posture? 
These questions we cannot totally answer here, but based upon President Trump doubling 
down on his America first strategy in his inaugural address, his immigration ban, his calling for 
cuts in the budget of the State Department, and calling for closer ties with countries like Russia 
there is clearly a sea-change in U.S. foreign policy. Under a Trump administration it is not totally 
clear that he will totally adhere to Quincy Adams’ advice of not going in search of monsters to 
destroy. At the very least, his foreign policy insight has become prominent and potentially domi-
nant once more. 
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